


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## MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS

SNIE 57-82

### CONFLICT IN KAMPUCHEA: PROSPECTS FOR THE RESISTANCE AND SELECTED IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Information available as of 6 September 1983 was  
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.

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## SUMMARY

In SNIE 57-82, of February 1982, the Intelligence Community estimated that the Kampuchean resistance groups—Son Sann's Khmer Peoples National Liberation Front (KPNLF), Prince Sihanouk's Moulinaka, and the Communist Democratic Kampuchea (DK)—were not likely to dislodge the Vietnamese from Kampuchea; that the resistance could indefinitely keep Vietnam from totally controlling Kampuchea as long as access to [ ] external support were assured; and that Hanoi would be unlikely to make any concessions that threatened its dominance in Kampuchea. These judgments remain unchanged.

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The Vietnamese are more firmly in control of the military situation in Kampuchea than in previous years. Their political control of the country, however, does not match their favorable military position.

As for the resistance groups, it is still too early to judge whether the DK's recent heightened activity represents a basic improvement in its overall capabilities. The KPNLF has increased its armed strength and made modest progress in training and organization, but it has been unable to conduct guerrilla warfare operations of sufficient size and depth to disrupt the Vietnamese significantly.

The long-term success of the resistance coalition formed in June 1982 in Kuala Lumpur by the DK, the KPNLF, and the Moulinaka remains in doubt because of differences among the three partners. Sihanouk's repeated threats to quit the coalition and Son Sann's recent threats to resign as coalition prime minister are symptomatic of the fragility of the coalition.

The major players in the Kampuchea conflict appear committed to their present strategies for the foreseeable future, and there are few developments that could force either side to seek a political solution.

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